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Larceny of Referendum Petitions
(CONCLUDED)
I. AMERICAN DECISIONS.
New York made a false start in 1810.1 Payne was convicted
of stealing a letter, charged to be "a piece of paper, on which a
a certain letter of information was written, of the value of twelve
dollars and fifty cents." The poorly considered per curiam
opinion reasoned thus, in quashing the conviction:
"The letter was of no intrinsic value, not importing any
property in possession of the person from whom it was tak-
en. A bond, bill, or note, was not the subject of larceny, at
the common law; and they certainly had as much worth in
themselves as this letter. (1 Hawk, C. 33, S. 22)."
Such may be expected to be the result when courts and writ-
ers attempt to give a justification for a rule that arose as a dictum
and always remained without a sound principle. The reasoning
of the New York court, however, is based upon a premise that
ignored half that was said to justify the common law rule as
to choses in action. With a chose, if the writing was gone the
obligation remained. With a letter if the writing was gone all
was gone unless perchance the contents had been memorized.
Defendant was convicted of receiving personal property
knowing it to have been stolen. Part of the property stolen was
"ten promissory notes, commonly called bank notes", "complete
in form but not issued".2 In answer to counsel for defendant,3
the court said:
"The charge refers to written contracts filled up and
remaining at the bank, which, on being lawfully put in cir-
culation, would have subjected the bank to pecuniary liabil-
ity. That such papers were the property of the bank, is en-
tirely clear; and this answers the exception. It is now said
1. Payne v. People (1810) 6 Johnson (N. Y.) 103.
2. People v. Wiley (1842) 3 Hill (N. Y.) 194.
3. "The court erred in ruling that the bank bills described in the in-
dictment were property, within the meaning of the statute". 1. c. 201.
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they were of no value; but that was not the exception. It
is obvious, however, they were of some value; and that, I
apprehend, is enough. - - ------ The recent case of Payne
v. The People (6 John, R. 103.) went on the ground that
the letter stolen was of no intrinsic value whatever, even as
a piece of paper. There is no color here for saying that,
of the bank issues. There are several cases in point. (The
King v. Clarke, 2 Leach, 1036; Rex v. Vyse Ry. & Mood.
Cr. Cas. 218.)"'
This case accords with the English cases in holding gener-
ally that written instruments are subject matter for larceny.
It should be contrasted with the doctrine urged by defendant in
the case tinder review that the petitions became public docu-
ments before they were filed.
In People v. Loomis5 the indictment was for larceny of "a
certain receipt". Defendant owed one Shepard seven dollars
and proposing to pay the debt took out of his pocket some.bank
notes and a prepared receipt. The latter was handed to Shepard
for signature. The notes were handed to Ramsdell (joint de-
fendant) and the defendant told Shepard that the money was
ready as soon as the receipt was signed. Shepard signed the
receipt and gave it to Ramsdell who failed to transfer the bank
notes but ran away with defendant at latter's request." The
Supreme Court of New York ordered a new trial, following
conviction, stating that "the prisoners should have been ac-
quitted".
7
The court argued that under neither the English statutes nor
the legislation in New York (punishing the theft of written in-
struments creating or affecting obligations) could the theft of an
ineffective written instrument be punished. Then it was argued
that the receipt there was totally ineffective because of the fraud
4. People v. Wiley (1842) 3 Hill (N. Y.) 1. c. 211.
5. (1847) 4 Denio 380.
6. The receipt was in the following words: "Ree'd of G. W. W.
Loomis seven dollars in full of all demands of every name and
nature up to this day. Dated." etc. 4 Denio 380.
7. (1847) 4 Denio 380.
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connected with its execution. It is not clear but apparently the
court conceived of the legislation in New York as the sole source
of authority to punish for larceny. There was no residuum of
common law. If such was the point of view it constituted a bold
stroke and one that was not suggested by the English cases de-
cided after English statutes extended the scope of larceny.
There seems, however, a basis for justifying the decision as
a matter of principle. It was noted in the outset that the in-
dictment was for theft of "a written receipt". There is no men-
tion of a second count for theft of "a piece of paper". If there
had been such a count the decision might have been contrary.8
Otherwise, one of two things would have been fairly certain:
(a) statutory legislation wiped out the common law; or (b)
common law conceptions were hopelessly confused.
It is also possible to justify the result upon the assumption
of a second count charging the theft of "a piece of paper". The
paper on which the receipt was written was the property of de-
fendant. It is also certain that it was in his possession until he
handed it to Shepard for signature. It is arguable that thereby
he transferred only custody of the paper to Shepard and that
possession always remained in defendant. If so, there was no
larceny.9
In People v. Griffin the charge was larceny of "a tin box
of the value of five dollars, and certain papers described as in-
struments in writing, consisting of three several receipts for
money, and three certificates of stock in incorporated compan-
ies". 1O It was held by Kings County Court of Sessions that un-
8. The court in discussing the common law stated: "But although such
instruments could not, in strictness, be stolen, the paper or parch-
ment on which they were written might be, and prosecutions for
petty thefts of this description have frequently taken place." Among
others, Clarke's Case, R. & R. 181, Vyse's Case, 1 Moody 218, Rex
v. Bingley, 5 C. & P. 602 and Rex v. Mead, 4 C. & P. 535, were
cited. See a discussion of these cases in 21 Law Series p. 13 ff.
9. See 21 Law Series p. 18, note 46 and p. 23, note 60.
10. (1869) 38 Howard's Pr. Rep. 475.
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der the statute1 "common" receipts were not subject of lar-
ceny.' 2  The court distinguished "between common receipts and
accountable receipts, warehouse receipts and others of such
nature". "Receipts of this latter description are undoubtedly
the subject of larceny, but I am satisfied that common receipts
were not intended to be and are not embraced within the pro-
visions of the statute.' 1 3  So much goes only to the question
of the proper interpretation of the statute. Apparently, no con-
sideration was given to the thought that a "common" receipt
considered as a piece of paper constituted "goods", "chattels",
and "effects" within the meaning of the statute. Apparently
also, as usual in New York cases, there was no charge in the
indictment of the theft of "a piece of paper".
Furthermore, the court argued that "common" receipts are
not instruments.14  If this be true it is difficult to understand
11. The statute defined personal property to mean "goods, chattels, ef-
fects, evidence of right in action, and all written instruments by
which any pecuniary obligation or any right or title to property,
real or personal, shall be created, acknowledged, transferred, in-
creased, defeated, discharged or diminished". 1. c. 477. See People
v. Babcock (1810) 7 Johns, 201, 5 Am. Dec. 256: (Obtaining a
written receipt and request by a false assertion does not constitute
a, cheat, because (1)- no false token used and (2) ordinary prudence
guards against it. Whether a written instrument is subject matter
of cheat not argued.) Phelps v. People (1878) 72 N. Y. 334 (Con-
viction affirmed for larceny of a draft under a statute defining per-
sonal property so as to include "all written instruments by which
any pecuniary obligation - - - - shall be created, acknowledged,
transferred" etc.)
12. The Supreme Court of New York made a contrary suggestion in
People v. Loomis (1847) 4 Denio. I. c. 384: "It perhaps admits
of no doubt that a receipt for the payment of a debt or demand
may be the subject of larceny, under the revised statutes, -----. "
The "revised statutes" seems to refer to the same provision as set
forth in note"," supra.
13. People v. Griffin (1869) 38 Howard's Pr. Rep. 1. c. 478. Compare
State v. Scanlan (1903) 89 Minn. 244, 94 N. W. 686.
14. "Now common receipt such as are described in the indictment can-
not be properly called. instruments at all, for such documents have
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how the decision was helpful to defendant in State v. McCulloch.
The argument in the latter case was built upon the premise
that a referendum petition is a written instrument. Whether the
premise is acceptable depends upon terminology. The New York
court gave no satisfactory definition of a written instrument.
As to that part of the charge involving certificates of stock
the court held that the subject matter was covered by the statute
but a new trial was ordered for failure to prove sufficient value
to show grand larceny.
In 1885 the Supreme Court (fifth department) of New
York rendered a decision similar to that in People v. Loomis,
supra.1,5 Ella Comstock, the owner of a house and lot, had mort-
gaged the same to Sarah Comstock and then made an agreement
to sell the property to defendant. The mortgagee prepared a
discharge of the mortgage lien to be used upon certain condi-
tions which were never met. The discharge was secured by de-
fendant through fraud and placed on record. For this defend-
ant was convicted of larceny but a new trial was ordered. The
court reasoned that: (a) the instrument was not effective or
operative for any purpose at the time the defendant acquired
possession; and (b) "to constitute larceny of a written instru-
ment, the paper must be. effective and operative when taken"."
There is no difficulty in agreeing with proposition (a) but as
to (b) it must be recorded that the statement is contrary to many
decisions in cases where the indictment charged the stealing of
a piece of paper.1 7  Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that
no legal effect as instruments whatever, they are at most but ac-
knowledgments in writing of full or partial payment and may be used
in evidence to prove such payment. But they cannot be pleaded,
and when proven may be explained or contradicted; they are mere
written admissions and can only be treated as such. ------ There is
a broad distinction between legal instruments which are acts and
mere written admissions which are only evidence."
15. People v. Stevens (1885) 38 Hun. 62, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 583.
16. People v. Stevens (1885) 38 Hun. 62 1. c. 64, 3 N. Y. Cr. 583.
17. See review of English decisions in 21 Law Series p. 13 ff.
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the position of the New York court seems contrary to that taken
by counsel for defendant in State v. McCulloch."8
The court was not at liberty to reverse the conviction on
the common law theory that the instrument "savoured" of
the realty. In the first place it would seem proper to point
out that the instrument was not a deed of release until it had
been delivered. Whether the common law exemption as to
instruments "savouring" of the realty applied only to valid and
effective insl:ruments is not possible of dogmatic assertion.1 9 In
any event a New York statute 20 made an instrument by which
"any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property" is trans-
ferred or defeated personal property and by inference subject
to larceny. Another statute2' provided that certain specified
instruments in complete form but not effective as obligations
18. Counsel for defendant in State v. McCulloch deemed it of impor-
tance to convince the court that the instruments were completed in
order to say that they were not, therefore, subject matter of larceny.
The following is typical of the position taken: "If the instrument
is completed, that is all that is necessary, and the charge must be
for taking the instrument, and such an instrument is not the sub-
ject of larceny; and this is true, irrespective of the fact whether it
is or is not a public document."
19. This particular point was not considered by the court. It was con-
tent with announcing that if the instrument had been complete the
act would have been larceny under the statute. To that extent the
statute changed the common law as to instruments "savouring" of the
realty.
20. The Penal Code defined personal property as "every description of
money, goods, chattels, effects, evidence of rights in action, and all
written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title
to property, real or personal, is created, acknowledged, transferred,
increased, defeated, discharged, diminished, and every right and in-
terest therein." People v. Stevens (1885) 38 Hun. 1. c. 65, 3 N. Y.
Cr. R. 583. Compare: R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 4927, now R. S. Mo.
1919, Sec. 3716.
21. "An instrument for the payment of money, an evidence of debt, a
public security, or a passage ticket, completed and ready to be is-
sued or delivered, although the same has never been issued or de-
livered by the maker thereof to any person as a purchaser or owner."
People v. Stevens (1885) 38 Hun. 1. c. 65, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 583.
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should be subject to larceny. The latter statute did not include
the instrument under consideration and the court did not think
of the statute as merely declaratory of a part of the common
law. Apparently it was thought that the statute by mention of
certain instruments assumed that the common law was different
as to other ineffective instruments. Accordingly, People v. Wiley,
supra, was treated as an exceptional case. It seems fair to say
that this interpretation derives no support from the cases de-
cided in England.
As in People v. Loomis, supra, there was a failure, appar-
ently, to add a second count to the indictment charging the theft
of "a piece of paper". If that had been done the story might
have been a different one.
People v. Hall 22 is perhaps the unfortunate offspring of
Payne v. People.23  Defendant in attempting to obtain title to a
tract of land had negotiations with Mrs. Burham with reference
to her claim of a lease of part of the property. As a result he
signed the following instrument:
"I hereby agree to pay Mrs. C. M. Burham the sum
of $200 for a release of twenty feet of ground on side of
building, and this note is to be null and void if Mrs. Enie
V. Coppelman does not pay me $1,000."
Later defendant snatched the instrument from Mrs. Bur-
ham's hand and destroyed it. The court (two to one) held that
the conviction would have to be reversed, saying in part:
"The note or paper was not property. It rested on noth-
ing. Mrs. Burham made no written agreement to release,
and her verbal promise was void -------- The note was
only a provision by Hall to take a title which Mrs. Burham
was not bound to give, nor Hall to take. Such a paper is
not the subject of larceny. Payne v. People, 6 Johns, 103."
The dissenting judge held that the instrument was "evidence
of debt or contract" under the statute. 24 This position may be
22. (1893) 74 Hun. 96, 26 N. Y. Supp. 403.
23. See p. 00 supra.
24. The statute included as subjects of larceny "any money, personal
property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or articles
of value of any kind."
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questioned if the instrument created no obligation. It does not
appear how the instrument was described in the indictment.
Except for Payne v. People, supra, and cases following it in New
York, there is no reason why the conviction could not have been
sustained as larceny of a piece of paper if the indictment had
been properly drawn.
The decisions in New York are far from satisfactory. Not
once has a court in that state (so far as cases reviewed have
disclosed) shown any thoroughgoing appreciation of the common
law doctrine as to written instruments as it was developed in
England. On the contrary the decisions give the impression
that New York as to this matter was a star out of its orbit, ac-
cepting the worst part of the past as fundamental and ignoring
the developments in the British courts. Part of it may be ac-
counted for in the false start in Payne v. People, supra, a poorly
considered opinion. Part of it may be due to an apparent failure
of prosecuting officials to adopt the simple devise of adding
counts to indictments charging theft of "a piece of paper". Part
of it may be attributed to an unfortunate tendency to consider
statutes as a substitution for the entire common law as to lar-
ceny rather than as changes of that law with a view of making
it more adaptable to social needs.
After it was too late, so far as New York was concerned,
a North Carolina judge displayed a real knowledge of the funda-
mentals. At least, Merrimon, J., in State v. Campbell2" seems
to have had a clear conception, of the common law rule as to
written instruments as developed in the Enlish cases. The charge
was for stealing "one due-bill of the value of fifty-four cents,
of the goods, chattels and moneys", etc., under a statute penaliz-
ing the theft of "any order, bill of exchange, bond, promissory
note, or other obligation, either for the payment of money or for
the delivery of specific articles". There was evidence that the
due bill stolen was one that had been taken up by the person
who issued it. The lower court declined to instruct that if the
25. (1889) 103 N. C. 344, 9 S. E. 410.
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due bill had been paid off and taken up and was worthless it
was not the subject of larceny. The Supreme Court held that
the refusal was error and ordered a new trial.
The court exhibited a clear understanding of the common
law rule as to choses in action 26 and stated a due bill would be
an "obligation" within the meaning of the statute but that a paid
26. "They are valuable and useful as such evidence, and, for the pur-
poses of the statute cited, have no other property or quality of value;
however, the paper or other thing on which they may be written
might possibly be treated as bits of personal property of trifling
value, and therefore the subject of larceny at common law. Indeed,
in cases similar to the present one, it has been not uncommon as a
measure of caution, to put two or more counts in the indictment,
charing in the first one, the larceny of a note, bond, or other thing
mentioned in the statute; and also, in a second one, the larceny of
the paper on which they were written. -- ---- It would not comport
with just and settled criminal procedure to indict a person for the
larceny of a promissory note, and allow him to be convicted upon
such charge of stealing a piece of paper."
Compare the statement of Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v.
Rand (1844) 7 Met. (Mass.) 475: "No question was made at the
argument, though it was open on the exceptions, whether bank bills,
after they are redeemed by the bank, are the subject of larceny. Bank
notes are expressly made the subject of larceny by the Rev. Sts.
c. 126, par. 17. Is there any implied exception of bank notes re-
deemed by the bank issuing them? We think not. The bank in
the present instance, were owners of the paper, which was of some
value to be re-issued, and they had the actual possession, by their
agent, and the perfect right of possession. But a consideration of
more importance is, that notwithstanding the bills were stolen, yet,
on being passed to a bona fide holder, the bank would have been
bound to him for the payment of them, in the same manner as if
they had not been redeemed. The injury to the bank is therefore
the same."
Kearney v. State (1877) 48 Md. 16: (statute prohibited receiv-
ing a stolen bond. The indictment charged defendant with receiving
"four pieces of printed paper commonly called 'United States five-
twenty bonds'." Held bad for failure to distinctly charge that the
"four pieces of printed paper" were bonds. Arguendo: "It has
been sometimes the practice, under statutes similar to this section
of our Code, to introduce into the indictments separate counts, charg-
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due-bill ceased to be an "obligation" and therefore not "the sub-
ject of larceny as a 'due-bill' or an 'obligation"'. The suggestion
was made that if the indictment had contained a count for larceny
of the paper on which the due-bill was written the defendant
might have been convicted properly. The New York cases of
People v. Loomis, People v. Griffin, People v. Stevens and Peo-
ple v. Hall, supra, might have been handled on the same basis.
In 181.5 the Supreme Court of North Carolina27 quashed an
indictment charging petty larceny of "one half ten shilling bill of
ing the larceny or receiving of 'one piece of paper of the value of one
penny', and in several cases which have been cited by counsel for
the state, such counts have been held sufficient to support a con-
viction. This practice was adopted in order to obviate the diffi-
culty in setting out doubtful instruments, or to meet a failure of
proof as to instruments duly charged in other counts. If there had
been such separate count in the present indictment, it might, under
these authorities, have been sustained." 1. c. 26)
Keller v. United States (1909) 168 Fed. 697: (indictment charg-
ing theft of "six blank checks with stubs attached, each of the value
of one cent, of the goods and personal property of the United
States" held sufficient to sustain a conviction.)
People v. McGrath (1888) 5 Utah 525, 17 Pac. 116: (conviction
for theft from a court reporter of "11 of his books, containing a
phonographic report of the testimony of witnesses examined on the
trial" of a certain case.)
State v. James (1877) 58 N. H. 67: (held that printed list of
names of subscribers to a newspaper together with dates of the per-
iods to which they had paid subject of larceny as a chattel and not
as evidence of a debt.)
People v. Carides (1915) 21 Cal. App. 836, 154 Pac. 1061: (held
that lottery ticket, void because issued in violation of law, could not
be subject of a grand larceny as a lottery ticket. Said as dictum:
"Considered as a mere piece of paper, the lottery ticket in question
possessed perhaps some slight intrinsic value, which, however small,
would have sufficed to make the wrongful taking of it petit larceny,
and, if that had been the charge preferred against the defendant,
it doubtless would have stood the test of demurrer.") See 4 Calif.
Law Rev. 251.
27. State v. Bryant (1815) 4 N. C. 249.
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the currency of the state" etc. The rather meaningless opinion
was as follows:
"The thing charged to be stolen is not stated with the re-
quisite precision and distinctness, to authorize the court to pro-
nounce judgment upon the offense, in the event of a conviction.
Considered as currency of the state, it is of no value, since no one
is compellable to receive it; it is not a tender in payment. Nor
could the defendant, by the description in this indictment, pro-
tect himself from a future prosecution for the same larceny. As
it is actually described, there is no such thing known in the cur-
rency of the state; as it was probably meant to be described, it is
not punishable as a larceny. Being therefore destitute alike of
artificial and intrinsic value, the indictment cannot be supported."
This decision was rendered before the English doctrine of
indicting for theft of a piece of paper had been well developed s
and there was heire no count of such import.
28. 21 Law Series p. 15.
Boyd v. Commonwealth (1842) 1 Rob. (Va.) 691.( semble, lar-
ceny of "divers goods and chattels" shown by proving theft of
"divers checks, bank notes, and United States treasury notes".
Whether decision was under statute or common law not clear.)
Ryland v. State (1857) 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 357. (theft of pocket
book containing bank notes. "It is not, nor could it be, controverted
that genuine bank notes are the subject of larceny in this state.")
Thomasson v. State (1857) 22 Ga. 499 1. c. 505: ("At common
law, bank notes being mere evidences of debt, were held to be not
such goods and chattels of which larceny might be committed. Cobb
793. Our statute, however, declares that the taking and carrying
away a bank bill belonging to another, with intent to steal the same,
shall be simple larceny.")
Johnson v. State (1860) 11 Ohio State 324: (bank bills held
not to be money with in the meaning of the statute. Court willing
to give such a construction except that other sections in the statutes
forbade such a construction.)
United States v. Morgan (1805) Fed. Case No. 15808: (held
that charge of receiving a bank-note under federal statute men-
tioning "goods and chattels" only could not be supported. Strict
following of common law rule that a bank-note being a chose in
action is not subject matter for larceny.)
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In Culp v. State29 the indictment charged of the theft of:
(1) "seven paper bills of credit, on the Bank of the United
States", (2) "seven bank notes on the United States Bank" and
(3) "seven paper bills of credit." The judgment of conviction
was arrested. An Alabama statute made "promissory notes for
the payment of money" subject matter of larceny. The first
count was held defective because the Bank of the United States
was prohibited from issuing bills of credit of the value of those
described. The second count was held defective because bank
notes were not within the terms of the statute. 30 The third count
was bad because a state could not issue bills of credit under the
federal constitution. Congress had exercised its power through
the Bank of the United States alone and from this point of view
they were bad for reasons stated above. Whether bills of credit
could have been issued by an individual or private corporation
was not discussed. Observe also that there was no count for
theft of seven pieces of paper.
State v. Colvin (1849) 22 N. J. L. 207: (receiving stolen bank-
bills not a violation of statute punishifig the reception of stolen
"goods and chattels.")
United States v. Bowen (1817) Fed. Case No. 14628: (stealing
bank note no offense at common law.) U. S. v. Carnot (1824) Fed.
Case 14726, accord.
29. (1834) 1 Porter (Ala.) 33, 26 Am. Dec. 357.
30. The Court argued that bank notes and promissory notes were so
different "in legal apprehension and common acceptation" as to for-
bid the deduction that one was embraced by the other "in contempla-
tion of the legislature". Compare: Wilson v. State (1834) 1 Porter
(Ala.) 118: (prosecutor under agreement made out four promissory
notes. Later he delivered them to defendant upon condition that
latter pay the sum stipulated; but defendant escaped from prose-
cutor's presence without doing so and disposed of the notes as his
own property. Held not larceny under statute since notes were
invalid. Rex v. Phipoe, 21 Law Series, note 60, cited.)
Collinr et al v. People (1866) 39 Ill. 233: (U. S. treasury notes
held to be goods and chattels so far as the formality of the in-
dictment is concerned. The statute is not set out but apparently
included "bond, bill, note" as subject of larceny. Held, also, that
there could be no conviction unless the notes were genuine. Nothing
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In Moore v. Commonwealth3' the indictment under a statute'
punishing false pretences alleged in part that defendant did "by
means of the aforesaid false pretence, obtain from the said Philip
Harman, a receipt of great value, to-wit, a receipt in full for the
payment of money, to-wit, for the payment of $8.78", etc. 31
(Italics supplied.) The evidence was that defendant was in-
debted to Philip Harman and in part payment gave Harman a
five dollar bank note, the said bank note having been issued by a
bank that had failed several years before. The statute punished
the obtainment by false pretence "any money, personal property,
or other valuable things." The Supreme Court by a three to two
decision reversed the judgment of conviction. Two reasons seem
to have prompted the decision: (a) the receipt was of no value;
and (b) the object of the statute "was to prevent the obtaining
of money or goods or other valuable things by false tokens or
false pretences, and has no relation to the payment and settlement
of old debts and accounts". 33
It is to be observed that the indictment was in one count and
there was no charge of obtaining "a piece of paper". The de-
cision means, therefore, that a voidable receipt was not as such
personal property under the Pennsylvania statute. It is not a
decision that "a piece of paper" is not personal property within
the protection of the criminal law. The suggestion that property
-must have a saleable value does not seem correct on principle.3 4
W. J. Wilson was indicted for the theft of "the following
to show that they were otherwise than genuine and court was not
presented with the problem of considering whether as pieces of
paper they might be the subject of larceny.)
State v. Dobson (1840) 3 Harr. (Del.) 563: (indictment for
larceny of bank notes, Held must be some proof of genuineness.)
State v. Tillery (1817) 1 Nott & M'Cord 9: (theft of bank
note in violation of statute. Held that necessary to prove that it
is a "true" note and that something is due thereon.)
31. (1848) 8 Penn. St. 260.
32. (1848) 8 Penn. St. 1. c. 261.
33. (1848) 8 Penn. St. 1. c. 264.
34. See 21 Law Series p. 13, note 29.
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described personal property" - - - "to-wit, one railroad pas-
senger ticket printed, issued and signed by the Oregon-Washing-
ton Railroad & Navigation Company, a private corporation-, as
evidence of the right of a passenger to transportation on the rail-
road of said company".3 5 Judgment of conviction was affirmed
in a liberal opinion. The facts were that the defendant abstract-
ed the ticket from the rack in the company's office. He then
stamped the ticket and was apprehended while trying to sell it.
It will be observed, therefore, that the ticket had never been is-
sued by the company and was not evidence of a chose in. action.
It would seem, in truth, to have been nothing more than "a piece
of cardboard". It is believed that in England ordinarily the in-
dictment would have charged the theft of "a piece of card-
board".3 I t'is entirely possible to argue that the Oregon court
thought the facts were within the Oregon statute. The opinion
is not particularly clear but there is language to indicate that the
conviction would have been sustained even though the statute had
made no mention of a railroad ticket as subject of larceny.' T
35. State v. Wilson (1912) 63 Oregon 344, 127 Pac. 980. The Oregon
statute provided: "If any person shall steal any goods or chattels
or any Government note, bank note, promissory note, bill of ex-
change, bond or other thing in action, - - - or any railroad, railway,
steamboat or steamship passenger ticket or other evidence of the
right of a passenger to transportation which is the property of anoth-
er, such person shall be deemed guilty of larceny."
36. See p. 18, 21 Law Series.
37. "Within the meaning of the case of Jolly v. United States, this
railroad ticket, although yet in the possession of the company, would
be the subject of larceny because it is comprehended within the
general term of 'any goods or chattels' used in our statute." I. c.
350.
The brief for defendant in State v. McCulloch quotes the de-
cision as standing for the proposition that a railroad ticket was not
the subject of larceny at common law. If it be assumed that the
ticket has been issued by the carrier that would seem correct on prin-
ciple. See, however, Regina v. Boulton (1849) Denison 508, 21 Law
Series 18.
State v. Musgang (1892) 51 Minn. 556, 53 N. W. 874; (theft
of "a book containing about 100 blank forms for passes" prepared
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for use of employees on railroad. They had not been countersigned
by the officer, without whose signature they were of no avail. Held,
not larceny under statute providing that crime of larceny should
apply to "a passage ticket completed and ready to be issued or de-
livered, although the same has never been issued or delivered by
the maker thereof to any person as a purchaser or owner". Ap-
parently no attempt to indict for theft of a "book" or so many
"pieces of paper".)
Millner v. State (1885) 15 Lea 179: (railroad ticket subject of
larceny under statute making it an offense to steal "any instrument
or 'writing whereby any demand, right or obligation is created,
ascertained, increased, extinguished or diminished, or any other
valuable writing".) See State v. Morgan (1902) 109 Tenn. 157, 69
S. W. 970; State v. Wilson (1895) 95 Iowa 341, 64 N. W. 266;
State v. Brin (1883) 30 Minn. 522, 16 N. W. 406.
McCarty v. State (1890) 1 Wash. 377, 25 Pac. 299, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 152: (information charged theft of "ninety-three railroad pas-
senger tickets, of the aggregate value of one hundred and twenty
dollars". Held invalid: "The value of each ticket should have been
alleged, and the information should have shown that they were
geniune, effective, railroad tickets, as an unstamped, undated, and
unsigned railroad ticket is not the subject of larceny--------
Without these qualifications, the so-called railroad tickets had no
more value that the intrinsic value of the paper on which they are
printed, with the cost of preparing them. As this information did
not charge the value of the paper, it could not be proven." See
Commonwealth v. Randall (1875) 119 Mass. 107; State v. Holmes
(1894) 9 Wash. 528, 37 Pac. 283.
Patrick v. State (1906) 50 Tex. Cr. Rep. 496, 14 Ann. Cas.
177: (indictment charged theft of "six railroad tickets reading
from Texarkana, Texas, to Kansas City, said tickets of the value
of fourteen and 65/100 dollars each, and of the aggregate value of
eighty-seven and 90/100 dollars". Held defective: should have
alleged (1) name of railroad; (2) that it was incorporated; and
(3) that tickets had been issued, if such was the case. "It may be
that the indictment was good for theft of any unissued railroad
tickets, but it was certainly not good for railroad tickets that had
been issued by the company and entitling the holder thereof to
transportation." Considered as "bits of paper" the value alleged
in the indictment could not have been sustained and that no doubt
would be important in determining the degree of crime and the
punishment.)
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William Lawless s was indicted for larceny of "a certain
paper writing, called and being a 'discharge' from the military
service of the United States of the value of one hundred dollars".
The discharge paper was not offered in evidence and it did not
appear what were its contents or what was its value except that
two witnesses spoke of it as a discharge from the military service
of the United States. It was not argued that the written instru-
ment was not the subject of larceny unless the jury should find
that it had no value. The jury did not so find and "they were in-
structed that the paper was of no value unless the Commonwealth
proved it to be of some value". There was no evidence that the
particular paper had any peculiar value. The court contented it-
self with saying: "Its name, and its description in the indictment
and by the evidence, sufficiently informed the jury what it was,
and enabled them to judge whether it was or might be of value to
the owner".3 9 The defendant was held to have been properly
convicted of larceny.
Whether a postage stamp is a written instrument depends
upon what is included in the latter term. There is very little in
written language upon the ordinary postage stamp but there is an
implied contract on behalf of the federal government upon the
sale of the stamp even though the obligation may be an imperfect
one. In Jolly v. United States4 it was held that postage stamps
in the possession of government agents, which had not been is-
38. Commonwealth v. Lawless (1869) 103 Mass. 425.
39. Commonwealth v. Lawless (1869) 103 Mass. 1. c. 431.
Commonwealth v. Brettun (1868) 100 Mass. 206, 97 Am. Dec.
95: (statute made promissory notes the subject of larceny. Indict-
ment for larceny of 'one promissory note of the value of three
hundred dollars, and one piece of paper of the value of three hun-
dred dollars, of the goods and chattels of James H. Anthony' held
good without further description.)
State v. Thatcher (1872) 35 N. J. L. 445 1. c. 452: (statutory
terms "other valuable thing" included the act (thing) of signing
as surety on a negotiable note of which defendant was maker, and
on which prosecutor was fradulently induced to sign as surety.)
40. (1898) 170 U. S. 402.
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sued to customers, were the subject of theft under a statute
punishing one who feloniously took away "any kind or descrip-
tion of personal property". 1  The court was mindful of the fact
that stamps like bank notes were incapable of being distinguished
and "are not mere obligations but a species of valuable property
in and of themselves the moment they are out of the possession
of the Government". This represented a step in advance of the
doctrine that bank notes were choses in action and therefore not
subject of larceny.
It is also satisfying to know that the court was aware of the
English doctrine permitting prosecution for theft of the paper or
parchment on which an instrument was written. 2
It is a possible view that the postage stamps were public doc-
uments. If so, the decision is an authority against the view so
strongly presented to the Criminal Court of Greene County, Mis-
souri, that public documents are not subject of larceny. a3  As to
41. The court made this sufficient argument: "There is, while the
stamps are in the possession of the Government, some intrinsic value
in the stamps themselves as representatives of a certain amount of
cost of material and labor, both of which have entered into the
article in the process of manufacture entirely aside from any prospec-
tive value as stamps." 1. c. 406.
42. "Although at common law written instruments of any description
were not the subject of larceny, as not being personal goods; that
is, movables having an intrinsic value, yet although such instru-
ments could not in strictness be stolen, the paper or parchment on
which they were written might be, and prosecutions for petty thefts
of this description frequently took place in England." 1. c. 407. The
statement seems too broad. If the instrument was a chose in action
theft could not be committed of the paper on which it was written.
43. "If the petitions are completed instruments, the charge must be
laid for taking them as such, having absorbed the paper and such
writings are not the subject of larceny at common law. If they are
public documents, they are not the subject of larceny at common law
and, furthermore, not the subject of private or personal ownership
by Heilman." Brief for defendant (State v. McCulloch) p. 48.
"They are therefore public documents because devoted solely to a pub-
lic purpose and are not the subject of larceny." Opinion by Judge
Patterson, 21 Law Series, p. 7.
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the argument in State v. McCulloch that the petitions were not
"the subject of private or personal ownership by Heilman" it
might be suggested that in Jolly v. United States the second count
charged that the theft of the postage stamps was "from the pos-
session of Thomas McClure, the postmaster". The conviction
was upon both the first and second counts. Of course, it may be
said that the stamps were the property of the United States. The
reply is that larceny is a violation of possession and not of prop-
erty.
II. MISSOURI AUTHORITIES
It would seem that from the very outset the Supreme Court
of Missouri refused to accept the common law as to larceny of
choses in action. In State v. Newell4 there was an indictment for
obtaining bills of exchange by false pretenses. The court in hold-
ing the indictment sufficient as to demurrer stated as follows:
"The words of the statute on which this indictment seems to
be predicated, are: 'If any person or persons, knowingly and de-
signedly, by any false pretense or pretenses, obtain from any
other person or persons, moneys, goods, or merchandise, or ef-
fects Whatever, with intent to cheat or defraud such person or
persons of the same, he shall, on conviction,' etc. The first ques-
tion is, will the word 'effects' embrace a bill of exchange? This
appears to be a question of construction. The design of the
Legislature seems to have been to embrace every kind of case;
they, there-fore, after mentioning all sorts of personal things in
possession, say, or effects whatever; no doubt intending to em-
brace something more than money, goods, or merchandise. fy
name, effects will embrace lands, tenements, etc. Effects in law
must mean everything which is subject to the laws of property and
ownership, whether real or personal; and of the personalty wheth-
er of possession or in action. A bill of exchange is not money, but
is a security for money, because it contains the proof that money
is due, and a promise to pay it. It is also a species of merchandise,
44. (1822) 2 Mo. 249.
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or rather answers the end of money, in passing like money. It
is effects, within the meaning of the statute; and this Court
have already decided, that promissory notes are effects; (see the
case of the Bank of Missouri v. Douglass.) But it is said,
these bills are not effects, till they have passed out of the hands
of the drawer. My opinion, is, that if A, by false pretenses,
cheats B, into making a bill of exchange, to be delivered to him,
and to be used by him, that this is cheating B of effects, or means
of living. The statute was made to prevent the wicked and cun-
ning part of mankind from preying on the less wicked and cun-
ning; to protect the unwary; to be the guardian of the ignor-
ant and unwise. The end and the means by which the fraud
is effected, is perfectly immaterial. Experience has shown that
men grow cunning in new devises as speedily as law can be made
to prohibit the old. The statute, therefore, uses general words,
and prohibits the act to be done, without regarding the means
by which it is effected."
The language of the court i.s rather remarkable and certainly
displayed no tendency to ignore the needs of society. 45 Three
points should be noticed. The decision makes no mention of
any statute making choses in action the subject of larceny or
false pretenses. There seems to be a desire to disregard the com-
mon law rule. In the second place it seems doubtful whether if
it be assumed that a bill of exchange is an "effect" within the
statute the same should be held as to a bill of exchange, the
drawer of which is the prosecutor. In such a case it would
seem that the bill is not valid and that all the accused secures
is a piece of paper. If the accused furnished the paper it would
not seem that he obtained any property by securing the signa-
ture of the prosecutor. The third point is that the Supreme
Court had a broad and liberal attitude in construing the statute.
The word "effects" was given a wide meaning and there was
not the slightest disposition to apply the rule of ejusdem generis
45. "Here, by false pretenses, a right or chose in action has been ob-
tained; it is an effect, and the transaction is, in an eminent degree,
the object of criminal law." 1 Mo. 1. c. 250.
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so as to hold that "effects" was a general term following the
particular words "moneys, goods, or merchandise" and therefore
to be limited in its meaning.
It has been pointed out that the common law rule as to
choses in action logically meant that a bank-note was not subject
matter of larceny. Some decisions went that far. The Supreme
Court of Missouri apparently had no faith in such a notion. In
McDonald v. State is the following:
"Third. The thirty-second section of the third article of the
act concerning crimes and punishments, is in these words: 'Every
person who shall steal, take and carry away any money or per-
sonal property of another, etc., shall be deemed guilty of larceny',
etc. The indictment charges that he did steal, take and carry
away a bank-note, for the payment of ten dollars, of the value
of five dollars. A bank note is personal property; it is personal
effects. In State v. Newell, 1 Mo. R. 248, a bill of exchange is
decided to be personal property or effects.""
In State v. Logan47 the Supreme Court in passing en the
sufficiency of an indictment argued in this fashion: "We can-
not conceive how it is necessary that the title of the book should
be given. The substance of the offense is stealing a book of the
value of three dollars. It cannot be material, whether the book
was printed, written or blank. If this book was in blank, it
could have no title page, yet it would be the subject of larceny."
Probably no one would deny the soundness of the argument.
The indictment in State v. McCulloch charged the taking of
"three hundred and sixty-nine (369) paper pamphlets each of
which pamphlets contained eight (8) leaves." The difference
between a book and a pamphlet for the present purposes seems
unreal.
These seem to be the precedents in Missouri aside from
the decisions depending on statutes changing the common law
46 McDonald v. State (1843) 8 Mo. 283 1. e. 285. Compare U. S. v.
Moulton Federal Case 15827 and U. S. v. Davis (1829) Federal
Case 14930.
47. (1825) 1 Mo. 532.
LARCENY OF REFERENDUM PETITIONS
rule. The authority is meagre but so far as it goes it exhibits
a wholesome tendency and one that lends no sanction to the de-
cision rendered in the Criminal Court of Greene County, Mis-
souri.
There is another proposition that was urged by the attorneys
for defendant in State v. McCulloch and was adopted, apparent-
ly, by Judge Patterson in rendering his decision: "Under section
492748 of our statutes only such written instruments as affect
pecuniary obligations or such written instruments as affect title
to property are personal property and, as such property, the sub-
ject of larceny. '40  Section 4927 reads as follows:
"The term 'personal property', as used in this law,50 shall be
construed to mean goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in
action, and all written instruments by which any pecuniary ob-
ligation, or any right or title to property, real or personal, shall
be created, acknowledged, assigned, transferred, increased, de-
feated, discharged or diminished." 5' 1
The argument was that the referendum petitions were not
evidences of rights in action nor the sort of written instruments
mentioned in the statute. That much must be granted. It does
not follow, however, that there are no other written instruments
except those mentioned. The inference is to the contrary and any
fair definition of the term "written instrument" would seem to
confirm the inference. The attorneys for defendant gave an ac-
ceptable definition in stating in effect that a written instrument
is a piece of paper containing writing. 2 Upon the basis of this
definition it becomes apparent that Section 4927 has not included
all written instruments. No doubt, the court rendering the de-
48. R. S. Mo. 1909.
49. See p. 7, 21 Law Series.
50. The phrase "in this law" is assumed to refer to the chapter dealing
with crimes and punishment.
51. Now Section 3716, R. S. Mo., 1919.
52. Reply brief for defendant, p. 18. It is proper to suggest that cloth,
parchment, metal or stone would do as well as paper. The symbols
may be printed, typewritten, written, carved,-in fact any known
method that is reasonably permanent should be sufficient.
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cision in State v. McCulloch would have admitted as much as a
premise for a conclusion that since no written instrument was
subject of larceny at common law only such as are included
within Section 4927 are subject of larceny in Missouri. It has
been the purpose, however, of all that has been heretofore writ-
ten to demonstrate that the authorities are overwhelmingly against
the view that no written instrument was subject matter for lar-
ceny at common law if the indictment was properly drawn.
It should be observed, also, that Section 4927 includes
"goods, chattels, effects" within the meaning of the term per-
sonal property. Missouri decisions, quoted above, held a bill
of exchange and a bank note to be effects. The same would
seem to be true of any other written instrument, including a
referendum petition.
The apparent purpose of Section 4927 was to make certain
sorts of written instruments-choses in action and instruments
"savouring" of realty-subject of larceny by classifying them as
personal property. To hold that the legislature in doing this
succeeded in depriving all other written instruments of the pro-
tection of the criminal law would be a strange construction.
Surely, no one would deny that the purpose of legislation dealing
within the subject matter of larceny has been to liberalize the
common law conceptions. The construction given to Section 4927
by the court in question was restrictive and resulted (if the major
premise of this article is correct) in withdrawing written instru-
ments protected by common law from any security of the crim-
inal law of Missouri.
Section 4927, however, is not the last word in the deter-
mination of the decision under review. The indictment was
based upon Sections 4250 and 4528.5' The former defined the
crime of burglary in the second degree as breaking into certain
enclosures in which any "goods, wares, merchandise or other
valuable thing" is kept or deposited with intent to steal or com-
mit a felony. The latter section provides the procedure in case
53. R. S. Mo., 1909; now Sections 3297 and 3305 R. S. Mo., 1919.
LARCENY OF REFERENDUM PETITIONS
"any person in committing burglary shall also commit a lar-
ceny". The term "larceny" is not defined in that section.
It is worthy of particular attention that the words "personal
property" do not occur in Section 4520. How is it possible, then,
for Section 4927 to have any application? 'The only question
that seems to arise is whether a referendum petition is a valuable
thing. Honest reasoning compels an affirmative answer. There
is no occasion for extending the fictitious reasoning of Coke's
time with reference to choses in action.
To ascertain what is meant by the term "larceny" as used
in Section 4528 it seems necessary to keep in mind the accepted
common law and refer to Sections 4535 and 4548.54 Section
4535 specifies the subject matter of grand larceny as "any mon-
ey, goods, rights in action, or other personal property or valuable
thing whatsoever" of the value of thirty dollars or more." Sec-
tion 4548 specifies the subject matter of petit larceny as "any
money or personal property or effects of another under the value
of thirty dollars". It is to be noticed that the two sections differ
in the terms used even though there seems to be no occasion for
a difference in specifying the subject matter. It is a fair illus-
tration of the proposition that statutes are seldom symmetrical
or even self sufficient.
Conceding that Section 4927 (under whatever interpretation
may be decided upon) controls the words "personal property"
as they appear in both sections what is to be said of the terms
"valuable thing whatsoever" and "effects"?"
Labor and material go into referendum petitions the same
as other written instruments. They represent a certain expen-
diture of society's productive forces and sound judgment would
54. R. S. Mo., 1909; now Sections 3312 and 3325, R. S. Mo., 1919.
55. Certain animate objects, regardless of value, are also specified.
56. Since the indictment charged the value to be less than thirty dol-
lars it would seem that Section 4548 rather than 4535 would con-
trol. But it seems preferable to hold that the decisive factor would
be the understanding at common law as to subjects of larceny and
in addition any subjects which may have been added by statute.
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seem to compel an admission that they are either valuable things
or effects even if it be admitted, that they are not personal prop-
erty within the meaning of Section 4927. If this is true then the
taking of referendum petitions may be larceny under Sections
4535 and 4548 regardless of the interpretation to be given Sec-
tion 4927.
Counsel for defendant 7 in State v. McCulloch suggested
that the rule of ejusdem generis applied and that the words
"valuable thing whatsoever" should be restricted by interpreta-
tion to apply only to things of the same general class as those
included within, the preceding words "personal property" as de-
fined by Section 4927.
It is doubtful whether Section 4535 is an apt statute for
the application of the rule. The important words in the section
are "money, goods, rights in action, or other personal property
or valuable thing whatsoever". This is not a collection of specific
or particular terms followed by a generic term. Other words
among those quoted seem as general as "valuable thing".
Even if it be conceded that the rule of ejusdem generis
should be applied it niust be remembered that the rule is at most
only a guide to the legislative intent.58 The rule is not an end
within. itself. Surely, it is not to be believed that the Missouri
legislature intended by the adoption of Section 4535 to eliminate
from the subject matter of larceny anything that was larceny at
common law.
Finally, it is to be observed that the argument by defend-
ant's counsel takes no heed of Section 4548, defining petit lar-
ceny. Furthermore, the whole argument as to the application of
the rule requires a conviction that Section 4927 has removed
from the protection of the criminal law of Missouri those writ-
ten instruments which (it is submitted) were subject to larceny
at common law.
57. Brief for defendant, p. 54.
58. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 279.
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III. CONCLUSION
The decision under review has attracted unusual attention
in view of the fact that it was rendered by a trial court. It was
harshly criticised in a learned article which appeared in the
Central Law Journal. 59 Some of the more pertinent paragraphs
should be copied here.
"There are three clear fundamental errors in this opinion.
First, it. does not correctly state the common law rule; secondly,
it does not fairly construe the state statute; thirdly, it does not
accurately define the term 'property'. In the first place the com-
mon law did not exclude all 'written instruments' as subjects of
larceny. In the second place the Missouri statute does not ex-
empt certain property from this common law rule, but provides
generally that persons may be convicted of larceny who steal 'any
money, goods or other personal property or valuable thing what-
soever'. In the third place in seeking to show that referendum
petitions are not 'personal property', within the terms of this
statute, the court improperly confines the meaning of this term
to absolute interests in chattels, when it obviously includes any-
thing in which one may have any right of user whatever, whether
absolute or qualified or whether it has a market value or a value
based only on a particular use of it by the possessor thereof.
"We have'already referred to the old case in the Year Books
which held that stealing the title deeds to property was not lar-
ceny. Lord Coke, by a process of technical refinements, applied
this principle to all evidences of choses in action. The common-
law rule, however, did not go any further. May on Criminal
Law, Sec. 272; Stephen's History of the Criminal Law (3rd
Ed.), p. 143. The reason for this rule as stated by Coke and the
early common law judges was that where a written instrument
was merely the evidence of an obligation, a theft of the paper
did not affect the obligation which still existed independent of
the writing, and therefore nothing of value was taken. That
reason is not even a decent reason for the absurd rule which
59. Vol. 91, p. 241.
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it seeks to sustain; it certainly is no reason whatever to sustain
the rule when applied to written instruments which do not rep-
resent pecuniary obligations and whose value inheres in the paper
itself, and what is written thereon. Therefore, in the absence
of statutes, all written instruments other than evidences of obli-
gations and title may be the subjects of larceny.
"But the Missouri statute, as quoted above, is as broad as
the statute in any other state where the effort has been made to
abrogate this absurd rule of the common law. But the court re-
fuses to take even this opportunity to escape the effect of a rule
which he believed existed at the common law. It would seem
that any judge should jump at the chance to relieve the juris-
prudence of his state from the burden of an inherited rule of law
which is ridiculous enough to make a Hottentot laugh. * * * * *
"The trial court's argument to show that a referendum pe-
tition was riot personal 'property' under the Missouri statute is
superficial and illogical. Anything is my property in which I
have a lawful right of user. The term 'property' is nothing but
the bundle of rights which the law declares an individual may
have or enjoy in a thing. A sheet of paper is a thing. It has
dimensions and it has value. Even if the writing thereon makes
it merely the evidence of a chose in action, as a note, at common
law the writing could be and frequently was disregarded and
the thief prosecuted for petit larceny for stealing a 'scrap of
paper'. 2 Russell, Crimes, 74-80.
"Nor need the value of the thing be 'appreciable', as the
court alleges, if by that is meant a market value. The thing
may be a Chinese laundry ticket and be worthless to everyone
but a Chinaman and yet be valuable to him * * * * * * * * * * * *
•****** ******
"Nor had the referendum petitions in the principal case be-
come public records; they were still the property of the circu-
lators until they were deposited with the proper authorities and
from that time only did they exert their influence as legislative
documents. No property ceases to be mine until I have parted
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with it. A deed is not a deed until it is delivered. A note is
not a note until it is negotiated. A declaration or answer, drawn
up and signed does not become a pleading until filed with the
clerk. In all these cases the owner of the writing retains his
ownership or right of user in the paper or document until he
parts with it.
"It is a matter of regret to every lawyer that cases involving
wrongs to society must ride off to defeat on. mere technicalities
even when properly understood, but it is little short of a catastro-
phe when judges go out of their way to give effect to technical
objections that have no relevancy whatever to the case.
"English lawyers often marvel at the rigidity with which
our courts adhere to the letter of the decisions of an ancient and
barbarous age from which their courts have long since departed.
The only explanation of this tendency is that our courts fail to ex-
ercise any independent judgment of their own, but are too ready
to take some other judge's opinion or some superficial text writ-
er's generalization as the law without any inquiry either as to
the soundness of the original rule or its exact limitations in view
of the facts of the particular case or the state of the law or
of society at the time the decision was rendered."
Nevertheless, the decision has found a defender in the St.
Louis Law Review.6 ° Therein the writer views Judge Patterson
as courageously refusing to indulge in judicial legislation. It
seems necessary, however, to point out that the author was in
error in saying that the petitions "were in the custody of one
of the Election Commissioners"."' Moreover, no authority is
cited for the author's conclusions except Sections 4520 and 4927.
Furthermore, there need be no apology in insisting that
courts do not devitalize our substantive law. Such seems to
have been the fear of W. L. Sturdevant who protested in Jour-
nal Issued by American Bar Association, in this fashion :12
"It is not our purpose here to discuss the merits of the
60. Vol. 6, p. 54.
61. 21 Law Series, p. 6.
62. Vol. VI, p. 113.
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legal question involved in this prosecution; but we think it
would not be out of place to suggest that this is but one more
example of a judicial proceeding that has caused people, not only
by thousands, but by hundreds of thousands, to express, in their
various ways, their utter contempt for the law and its adminis-
tration. It is such judicial fiascos that shock the common sense
of the masses of people and sow the seeds of anarchy; and this
is equally true whether due to defects in the law itself or in its
administration. The average man cannot, will not, understand,
how the perpetration of a great wrong, affecting a public or a
private interest, can be accomplished without a violation of the
law."
Kenneth C. Sears
University of Missouri, School of Law.
